Laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā as a Creative Function of Language

Nirmalya Guha

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gaṅgeśa claims that laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: "Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w's primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that 'the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w'. Thus laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā becomes a success." This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Gaṅgeśa's framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Gaṅgeśa says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)489-509
    Number of pages21
    JournalJournal of Indian Philosophy
    Volume40
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 10-2012

    Fingerprint

    language
    Functions of Language
    Secondary Meanings
    semantics
    examination
    Language
    Hearer
    Inference
    Theory of Language
    Utterance
    Language Faculty
    General Theory

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Philosophy
    • Cultural Studies

    Cite this

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    Laks{dot below}aN{dot below}ā as a Creative Function of Language. / Guha, Nirmalya.

    In: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 5, 10.2012, p. 489-509.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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