No Black Scorpion is Falling

An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence

Nirmalya Guha

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one's knowledge of y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmām{dot below}sā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)111-131
    Number of pages21
    JournalJournal of Indian Philosophy
    Volume41
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013

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    cognition
    introspection
    mediation
    Cognition
    Entity
    Locus

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Philosophy
    • Cultural Studies

    Cite this

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    No Black Scorpion is Falling : An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence. / Guha, Nirmalya.

    In: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013, p. 111-131.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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