On Arthāpatti

Nirmalya Guha

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Arthāpatti (postulation) does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)757-776
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Indian Philosophy
    Volume44
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 01-09-2016

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    indication
    Certainty
    Background Knowledge
    Misconceptions

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Cultural Studies
    • Philosophy

    Cite this

    Guha, Nirmalya. / On Arthāpatti. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. 2016 ; Vol. 44, No. 4. pp. 757-776.
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    On Arthāpatti. / Guha, Nirmalya.

    In: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 4, 01.09.2016, p. 757-776.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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