Transcendental self and the feeling of existence

Apaar Kumar

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant's larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant's philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence-as the obscurely conscious and temporally inaccessible modification of the state of the discursive subject, which is built into all the representations of such a subject. I also provide an account of how the transcendental self can be legitimately understood both as an epistemic condition for the possibility of experience as well as the representation of a non-naturalistic feeling of existence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)90-121
Number of pages32
JournalCon-textos Kantianos
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 01-06-2016

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Transcendental
Immanuel Kant
Conscious
Prolegomena
Discursive
Philosophy

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Kumar, Apaar. / Transcendental self and the feeling of existence. In: Con-textos Kantianos. 2016 ; No. 3. pp. 90-121.
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Transcendental self and the feeling of existence. / Kumar, Apaar.

In: Con-textos Kantianos, No. 3, 01.06.2016, p. 90-121.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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